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I
INTRODUCTION
Over at least the past quarter century there has been considerable debate
about the "gun problem" in the United States. Proposals up to and including
banning bullets and confiscating guns have been suggested. Policies directly
and indirectly affecting legitimate gun owners almost always meet stiff
opposition. In part, this opposition results from the tenacious and tightly knit
"gun culture."' Members of this culture are steeped in. the folkways and
mores of sporting gun use. They bridle at any attempt to blame them for
crime or restrict them in what they see as responsible behavior on their part.
Similarly, those who own guns for protection want crime levels enormously
reduced before they surrender their own guns. Additionally, given the large
number of privately owned guns in the United States today, 2 the technical and
legal impediments to effective gun prohibition may be insurmountable.
One policy, however, typically receives support from both pro- and anti-
control forces: Individuals committing crimes with guns should receive
harsher punishments than those who do not use firearms. 3 As Colin Loftin
and David McDowall point out:
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Mandatory sentencing or sentence enhancement for crimes committed with a gun are
politically popular because they offer apparent means of controlling gun violence
without imposing direct costs on legitimate gun owners. In principle, the costs are
borne completely by criminals and by the criminal justice system in the form of longer
sentences, more litigation, and so forth.
4
Mandatory sentence enhancers for firearms crimes could reduce firearm
crime rates in three ways. 5 First, those receiving enhanced mandatory
sentences may be deterred from committing crimes with firearms in the
future. That is, having received an extra-long sentence for commission of a
crime with a firearm, felons might choose to substitute other weapons for
firearms. In effect, they would be hoping for shorter sentences if caught
again. Criminologists refer to this as special or specific deterrence. Second,
the mandatory sentence enhancers could have a general deterrence effect.
People who have not yet committed a crime with a gun might substitute other
weapons after becoming aware of longer sentences associated with gun use.
Finally, there could be an incapacitative effect. Put simply, while gun
criminals are serving their enhanced sentences they cannot participate in gun
crimes. Hence, the crime rate would be reduced by the number of crimes they
would have committed had they been set free.
Both deterrent effects rely on communication of the added cost of gun
crime to the criminal, as well as on the criminal's evaluation of that cost as
being too great to bear. In addition, the criminal must see a relatively high
probability of receiving the enhanced sentence. To the extent that the
enhanced punishment is not communicated to the potential criminal, the cost
is evaluated as small, or the probability of enhanced punishment is seen as
low, criminals may still choose to commit gun crimes. Unlike deterrence,
however, the incapacitative effect occurs regardless of the offender's
knowledge or evaluation. Thus, only judicial refusal to enforce the law can
prevent a reduction in crime due to the sentence enhancer.
One might ask why either deterrence or incapacitation of gun criminals is
desirable compared to deterrence or incapacitation of other criminals. This
issue is especially critical in states with crowded prison systems. Given limited
prison space, enhanced mandatory sentences for gun crimes means not
incarcerating some nongun criminals who otherwise would have gone to
prison. Resolving this issue requires asking if anything is gained by
incarcerating gun, rather than nongun, criminals. Two pieces of evidence
suggest that more benefits accrue from incarcerating gun criminals. First, gun
criminals seem more likely to kill their victims than nongun criminals. For
example, gun robbers are more likely to kill in the course of committing
robbery than nongun robbers." This fact implies that lives would be saved
because some gun robbers might shift to less deadly weapons and because
4. Loftin & McDowall, One With a Gu Gets Yo Two: Miandatory Sentencing and Firearms 1 "ioleice in
Detmoit. 445 ANNALS 150, 163 (1981).
5. Loftin, Heumann & McDowall, Mandatory Sentencing and Firearms Vi'olence: Evaluating an
Alternative to Gu Control, 17 LAIW & Soc'' REv. 287, 303 (1983).
6. Cook, Reducing hijinr and Death Rates in Robberv, 6 POL. ANALYSiS 21 (1980).
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convicted gun robbers who receive longer sentences would be incapacitated
for longer periods. Similarly, Franklin E. Zimring reported that aggravated
assaults committed with guns are more likely to result in death than nongun
aggravated assaults. 7 Incarcerating individuals who commit aggravated
assaults with guns would presumably save lives due to the effects of special
and general deterrence and incapacitation.
A second reason to support the incarceration of gun criminals is that some
evidence suggests that gun criminals are disproportionately active in the
criminal world. Researchers who conducted interviews with incarcerated gun
criminals reported that:
In our analysis, the singular and distinguishing feature of the "high raters" is a pattern
of gun involvement: men who have done more than a few crimes armed with a gun are
in fact the most likely to have committed each and every kind of crime we asked about:
assault, robbery, burglary, rape, drug dealing, and right down through the list. We
refer to these men as Firearms Predators to emphasize the omnivorous character of
their criminal activities. To say that they contribute disproportionately to the crime
problem is a serious understatement. For all practical purposes, they are the crime
problem in America today. 8
II
RECENT RESEARCH ON FIREARMS SENTENCE ENHANCERS
Recently, several states have passed laws which mandate enhanced
sentences for crimes committed with firearms. Shortly after one such law was
implemented in California, Sheldon Messinger and Phillip Johnston reported
on speculation about the possible effect of the law:
A major ambiguity and problem is whether the new statute will result in longer prison
terms for most offenders; a related problem is whether it will result in the
imprisonment of a greater proportion of convicted felons. The weight of opinion,
after passage of the bill, was "yes" on both counts.9
Indeed, given the capacity of complex organizations to resist change, one
might ask if these new laws are employed at all. A Massachusetts law provides
an example of how the law can be circumvented. Massachusetts requires a
mandatory one-year sentence for illegally carrying a firearm.' 0  The law
removes discretion on sentence length from judges and parole boards.
Kenneth Carlson reported that as a result of the law, however, the police
"were now more selective about whom to frisk because they did not want to
risk involving 'otherwise innocent' persons."'' Of course, this would not have
been a problem had the law enhanced the sentence on an additional felony
7. Zimring, Is Gun Control Likely to Reduce V"iolent Killings?, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 721, 728, 735
(1968).
8. J. Wright, The Illicit Firearms Market: Some Preliminary Results from a National Study 7
(1984) (unpublished manuscript) (available at Dep't of Sociology, Univ. of Mass., Amherst, Mass.).
9. Messinger & Johnson, California's Determinate Sentencing Statute: Histoty and Issues. in
DETERMINATE SENTENCING: REFORM OR REGRESSION 30 (1978) (National Institute of Law
Enforcement, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration).
10. MAsS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 269, § 10(a) (West 1980).
11. NAT't. INsT. OF JUSTICE, DEI'T OF JUSTICE, MANDATORY SENTENCING: TIlE EXPERIENCE OF
Two STATES 6 (1982).
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instead of simple possession. Further, "in some instances an even greater
degree of power was granted to arresting officers, who could decide when to
look for a gun, and if they found one, whether to report."' 2 Some sentencing
discretion "was transferred to the district attorneys since the charge at
conviction now determined the length of the prison sentence if there was
one." ' 3 In other words, to circumvent the law district attorneys could simply
ignore the gun charge. Finally, even though the Massachusetts law removed
all sentencing discretion from judges in gun cases, judges' 4 were apparently
able to circumvent the law by increasing the proportion of not guilty verdicts
on final dispositions.' 5 In Massachusetts it seems that limiting discretion at
one point in the system (sentencing and parole) merely shifted discretion to
other points (arrest, charge, guilt/innocence).
The Michigan felony firearm law provides another glimpse at mandatory
sentence enhancers for firearms crime. In a series of papers, a group of
researchers evaluated the effects of Michigan's Felony Firearm Statute in
Wayne County (Detroit). 16 The Michigan law imposed a two-year mandatory
add-on sentence for defendants convicted of possession of a firearm while
committing a felony.' 7 The introduction of the law was well publicized.
Because the law mandates an add-on sentence for those who commit a felony
with a gun, Detroit police had no reason to circumvent the law. That is, they
had no reason to believe that the person possessing the firearm was
"otherwise innocent," as in the Massachusetts case. Moreover, the Wayne
County prosecutor refused to bargain on the firearms charge. Thus, the
Michigan Felony Firearm Law, as applied in Wayne County, provided a
natural experiment in which sentencing discretion was not allowed to shift
from judges and parole boards to prosecutors and police officers.
Despite strict application of the Michigan law, no difference was observed
in the average length of prison sentences assigned to gun criminals before
and after imposition of the law. This lack of change in the average sentence
for gun crimes could reflect either no change in sentencing policy, or no
change in sentencing practice for gun crimes with shorter sentences for
nongun crimes after the law took effect. In the latter case judges would be
following the letter of the law: Gun felons would be assigned longer
sentences. Further analysis, however, showed that after implementation of
the law there was no difference in prison sentence length assigned to nongun,
as opposed to gun, offenders. How did the Detroit courts avoid assigning the
extra mandatory sentence?
12. NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1I, at 3.
13. Id.
14. These are judges' and not jurors' decisions since the vast majority of not guilty verdicts
result from bench trials.
15. NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 7.
16. Heumann & Loftin, Mandator
, 
Sentencing and the Abolition of Plea Bapgaining: The Michigan
Felon' Firearms Statute, 13 LAW & Soc'' REV. 40 (1979); Loftin, Heumann & McDowall, supra note 5;
Loftin & McDowall, supra note 4.
17. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.227b (West Supp. 1985).
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The notion of a rough tariff, or going rate, for specific crime/criminal combinations
structured the courts' response to the Gun Law in two ways. In serious cases which,
even prior to the Gun Law, would have resulted in substantial time in prison,
sentences on the primary felony were adjusted downward to compensate for the two-
year Gun Law increment.
18
In less serious cases, which would have received less than two years of
prison before the Michigan gun law took effect, judges used three tactics:
"Among the options open to a judge were to find a defendant completely
innocent, to find him/her guilty of the felony but not of the Gun Law charge,
or to find him/her guilty of a misdemeanor, in which case the felony firearm
count automatically disappeared."' 9 Given the way that sentencing on the
Michigan Felony Firearm Law was subverted, it is not surprising that the
researchers found that the law had no effect on Detroit's gun crime rates.2 0
Nevertheless, Loftin, Heumann, and McDowall speculated that the
Michigan gun law may have been used against the most serious repeat
offenders, that is, to "throw the book" at "bad guys." 2 1 They could not
validate this suspicion because they lacked data on sentencing for second and
later convictions under the Michigan gun law.2 2 The researchers suggest,
however, that "courts faced with such serious offenders are less concerned
with the going rate. Thus, sentences which were high prior to the Gun Law
may, after the Gun Law, be even higher." 23 They point out that if the parole
board reduces the time actually served for good conduct in prison, even this
effect of the law could be thwarted. Additionally, since they considered only a
twelve-month period after implementation of the gun law, the researchers
speculated that a longer interval of study may show the law to be more
effective with the passage of time. 24
The research reported here attempts to address the deficiencies in the
Detroit studies. Data from a period of up to three years after the enactment of
a mandatory sentence enhancer for gun crimes are used. The longitudinal
approach allows a determination of whether these gun laws become more
effective as time passes. Second, this study includes defendants processed for
first and later arrests in order to determine whether such laws are used to
"throw the book" at "bad guys."
Data on criminal sentencing from the state of California are used in this
analysis. Since 1977, California law has required mandatory gun crime
sentence enhancement. The law does not allow prison sentences to be
shortened for "good time" served. California law mandates an additional
one-year prison sentence if a person or that person's accomplice is armed with
a firearm in the commission or attempted commission of a felony.2 5 If a
18. Loftin, Heumann & McDowall, supra note 5, at 298.
19. Id. at 301.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 300.
22. They did not know whether defendants had prior records.
23. Loftin, Heumann & McDowall, supra note 5, at 300.
24. Loftin & McDowall, supra note 4, at 163.
25. CAL. PENAL. CODE § 12022 (West 1982).
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person actually uses a gun in an attempted or completed felony, the
additional sentence is two years.26 For sex offences, simply being armed
dictates two additional years, while using a firearm adds a third year to the
prison sentence.2 7 The remainder of this article evaluates this set of
California laws.
III
DATA AND METHODS
A. Data
The data for this study were obtained from the State of California,
Department of Justice, Bureau of Criminal Statistics. The data base consists
of longitudinal histories of the processings of individuals through the criminal
courts. All defendants arrested for felonies in California whose cases reached
disposition by the police, prosecutor, or court in 1977, 1978, and 1979 are
included. Arrests could have occurred during this three-year period or
earlier. The processing histories include information regarding every time
any given individual entered, exited, and reentered the system during the
three-year period. The greatest number of arrests reaching disposition in the
three-year period for any given individual was fifteen. Processing histories
allow for evaluation of the effects of California's gun law for first-time, as well
as repeat, offenders. 28 Accordingly, each sequential arrest and rearrest of an
individual is analyzed separately. The data include information on both the
offense and the offender. Also included are variables reflecting the
processing of the case through the criminal justice system and the dates of
arrest and disposition. These dates are used to measure the length of time
required to process the case.
Only those defendants found guilty of a felony and sentenced to prison are
included in the analysis. Because the firearms enhancer refers only to prison
sentences, cases in which the sentence was suspended or probated without
any incarceration are excluded. In California, prison sentences are reserved
for those convicted of felonies; misdemeanants receive jail, probation, and
other more lenient sentences. For defendants with multiple charges, only the
most serious charge (as defined by the California State Department ofJustice)
is available. This situation is not as problematic as it might at first appear
because offenses involving firearms generally receive high severity codings.
While arrest and conviction charges may differ, sentencing is based on the
conviction charge. Since the interest here is sentencing practices, only the
conviction charge is analyzed.9 '
26. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.5 (West Supp. 1984).
27. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.3 (West 1982).
28. In this study, repeat offenders are those who were processed and convicted by the California
courts more than once in the three-year study period. Therefore, arrests and convictions before
1977 are not considered, potentially making estimates of the number of repeat processings for any
given criminal low.
29. The arrest and the conviction charge can be different due to "charge bargaining- between
the prosecutor and defendant.
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The data set is so large that all 450,000 cases could not be included. To
make the analyses more manageable, random samples were drawn from the
populations of first arrests, second arrests, and so on for each sequential
arrest of the same individual. More specifically, a three percent random
sample of all first arrests (regardless of whether the person was later
rearrested) resulted in 10,892 cases. Similarly, a ten percent sample of all
second arrests within the three-year period resulted in 2886 cases. A thirty
percent sample of third arrests yielded 1794 cases, and a seventy-five percent
sample of fourth arrests resulted in 1232 cases. Finally, all fifth and later
arrests were combined into a sample of 736 cases. From these five samples,
cases not resulting in conviction and a prison sentence were excluded,
reducing the samples to 313, 149, 124, 95, and 66 cases, respectively.
The coding of variables is relatively straightforward. The dependent
variable is the length of prison sentence in months. Life sentences are coded
as 600 months (fifty years) for those few defendants sentenced for life. This
coding is based on the assumption that the typical murderer is in his or her
twenties and will live into his or her seventies. Most of the independent
variables are binary coded, with comparisons made between the category
coded one and the category coded zero. The zero group serves as a
"reference category." For example, gender is coded one for females and zero
for males, allowing for determination of the effect of being female, compared
with being male, on sentence length.
Race/ethnicity is coded into two dummy variables.30 The effects on
sentence length of being Black and of being Chicano are compared with being
White. That is, for one variable Blacks are coded one and Whites and
Chicanos zero, and for the second Chicanos are coded one and Whites and
Blacks zero. By always coding Whites as zero, they serve as a reference point
for any effects of being Black or Chicano: Comparisons are made between
Blacks and Whites, and then between Chicanos and Whites. The decision to
separate Blacks and Chicanos, rather than to treat all nonwhites as one group,
is based on differences found by Marjorie Zatz in sentence lengths for these
two groups. 31 Joan Petersilia also found differences between these
racial/ethnic groups in use of guns or knives. 32 These studies were based on
similar California data. Use of two dummy variables (for Blacks and for
Chicanos), both in comparison with Whites, avoids confounding differences
between ethnic groups with the influence of using firearms. In this way, the
rival effects of race/ethnicity can be statistically held constant, thereby
clarifying the true relationship between use of firearms and sentence length.
Similarly, age is coded into two dummy variables with first "Young"
(eighteen to twenty years of age) and then "Old" (forty-one years of age and
over) offenders coded one, and everyone else coded zero. The twenty-one to
30. "Dummy variables" are binary coded variables (i.e., 0 or 1).
31. Zatz. Race, Ethnicitq, and Determinate Sentencing: .4 .Vez Dimension to an Old Controver, Y. 22
CRIMINOLOGY 147, 165 (1984).
32. J. PETERSILIA, RACIAL DISPARITIES IN rHE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM xxi, 78, 80 (1983).
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forty year old group serves as the reference category. The age categories are
based on the percentages of offenders in the sample; the Young and Old
categories capture the extremes, with approximately seventy percent of the
defendants falling between twenty-one and forty years of age. Such
categorizations are more useful than treating age as a continuous variable;
differences between groups of defendants are more important to sentencing
patterns than the effect of a one-year increment in age.
The type of offense is also binary-coded, resulting in nine dummy
variables. The appropriate variable is coded one if the person is convicted of
homicide, assault, burglary, theft, auto theft, forgery, rape, narcotics
violations, or some other felony. Each of these crime types is compared to a
robbery conviction. For each variable, the remaining eight crime categories,
along with robbery, are coded zero. The "other felony" category includes
those varied offenses not listed above (kidnapping, bribery, and pimping, for
example). The offense categorizations roughly follow the three-digit offense
code used by the State of California Departments of Justice and Corrections,
with some adjustments made for the relative frequencies of these offenses in
the sample analyzed (for example, "homicide" includes both murder and
manslaughter).
"Firearm" is also coded as a dummy variable. Zero indicates that the
defendant did not use a firearm in the commission of the offense, while a code
of one indicates that he or she did use a firearm. "Possession" is dummy-
coded as well, with zero indicating no possession of contraband and a code of
one meaning that the charge included possession. The only instances in
which both of these variables receive codes of one are possession or sale of a
machine gun, bringing guns into a jail, prison, or roadcamp, and possession
of a loaded weapon. 33
Offense severity is an integer scale which ranges in value from one through
nine, with a value of one reflecting the least severe offenses and nine
reflecting the most serious crimes. This scale is a collapsed and reversed
version of the severity scale used by the State of California, Department of
Justice and is based on the specific offense involved, not the categories
discussed above. For example, within the "homicide" category, murder has a
severity score of nine, manslaughter has a score of six, and vehicular
manslaughter with and without negligence have scores of two and one,
respectively. While the validity of this scale may vary for other states, it has
great validity for California courts since it was created and is used by the
California Department of Justice.
Offense specialization is also examined here. Several researchers have
examined crime specialization.3 4 Their analyses, however, were limited to
33. None of these offenses carries the enhanced mandatory sentence because possession does
not include or imply use. By controlling for these crimes in the possession variable their effects are
excluded from the firearm variable, as they should be.
34. See M. WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIO & T. SELLIN, DELINQUENCY IN A BIR-ii COHORT 206 (1972);
Bursik, The Dytionairs of Specialization injuvende Offenses, 53 Soc. FORCEs 851 (1980); Rojek & Erickson.
Delinquent Careers: 1 Test of the Career Escalation Model, 20 CRIMINOLOGY 5. 13-16 (1982).
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assessing the predictive power of the most recent offense type on the current
type of offense. They used simple Markov models in which only the
immediate prior offense is included. The limitation of this procedure is
apparent if one considers a hypothetical defendant arrested four times for
narcotics, a fifth time for robbery, and a sixth time for narcotics. When
examining the sixth offense, simple Markov models would not consider the
defendant to be a specialist in narcotics. Yet, five of the six arrests were for
narcotics. The offense specialization scale used here is more sensitive. It is
constructed on the basis of all prior arrests and measures the extent to which
individuals specialize in the type of offense for which they are currently
charged, considering all earlier offenses. The scale ranges in value from 0.0
through 1.0, with a value of 0.0 reflecting no specialization whatsoever, and a
value of 1.0 meaning that every arrest was for the same type of offense as that
currently charged. For example, rather than arbitrarily excluding the
hypothetical defendant described above simply because of the intervening
robbery arrest, the scale would assign this person a value of 0.86 in narcotics
specialization. The type of case disposition is coded into two dummy
variables reflecting cases resolved by guilty pleas and by juries. Bench trials
serve as the reference category for both variables. That is, the plea variable
cases that reached disposition by guilty plea are coded one and cases that go
to trial are coded zero. For the jury trial variable, cases resolved by jury are
coded one and cases decided by bench trials or guilty pleas are coded zero.
The effects of disposition by a plea of guilty and by jury trial are thus
separately contrasted with case disposition by a judge. Knowledge of who
decided the case provides some information on how the case was handled,
even though specific sentence recommendations (as to inclusion of mitigating
or aggravating circumstances) are not available.
Finally, the time required to process the case from arrest to disposition
and sentencing is measured in days. Bail status and time in detention were
not included in the data set. Persons detained for a lengthy time may be
especially willing to offer a plea, however, and the plea variable captures this
effect. Also, detention time is related to the length of time the case is in the
system, and this latter variable is included in the analyses.
B. Methods
If the firearms sentence enhancement is applied, then defendants who use
a firearm in committing offenses will have at least an additional year added to
their sentences. 35 To determine if it is indeed the use of a firearm that incurs
this additional time, the cases must be rendered equivalent on all rival factors,
thereby eliminating the impact of these factors on the relationship of interest
(the effect of firearm use on prison sentence length). This equivalency is
accomplished through Ordinary Least Squares multiple regression analysis.
35. A statistically significant addition to prison sentences of less aan one year would imply that
the law is not employed in every case, or that judges are enhancing sentences by less than what tie
law mandates.
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Multiple regression is a comprehensive and general approach to the analysis
of relationships among variables. It makes possible prediction of the effect
that a change in the value of an independent variable (e.g., firearm versus
nonfirearm) would have on the value of the dependent variable (prison
sentence in months). This procedure statistically removes distorting
influences caused by other independent variables, thus allowing for
estimation of the separate effects of each independent variable on sentence
length.
Ordinary Least Squares regression involves fitting a line to the data that
minimizes the amount of error in estimation. Estimates of the effects of
independent variables on the dependent variable are provided by the multiple
regression coefficients. These coefficients indicate the amount of increase (if
positive) or decrease (if negative) in the dependent variable for a one-unit
difference in the independent variable of interest, controlling for the other
variables in the equation. The one-unit difference refers to the coding of the
variables. For example, the dependent variable (prison sentence length) is
measured in months, and the firearms variable is coded one for those using a
firearm and zero for those not using a firearm. Thus, the regression
coefficient for firearms use translates into the additional months added to the
sentence for persons who used a firearm, compared with those who did not
use a firearm.
If the coefficient is twelve (months) or greater, and is statistically
significant, then the law is being upheld. If it is not significant or is less than
twelve, then the law is not being applied. Tests of statistical significance are
rules that aid in deciding whether to accept or reject the hypothesis that a
given effect differs greatly from zero. The tests reveal how likely it is that
conclusions based on a sample also hold true for the population from which
the sample was selected. If an effect is statistically significant, then the effect is
probably "real" and not an artifact of chance or random factors. No effect is
absolutely significant or absolutely nonsignificant; rather, significance levels
are used which refer to the probability that an error would occur in saying that
an effect differs from zero. In the social sciences, this level is conventionally
set at .05 or lower, meaning that only five (or fewer) times out of 100 would
this effect result from chance alone. Some coefficients might appear quite
large, but still not be statistically significant. In such cases, the standard error
of the estimate is also large, making the measured effect likely to be the result
of chance factors and not really true in the population at large. For this
reason, it is important to consider the statistical significance of the effect as
well as its size and substantive importance.
IV
ANALYSES
The analyses test the impact of the use of a firearm in committing a crime
on sentencing practices in California. Rival factors that might explain prison
sentence length are held constant. That is, the distorting influences of
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race/ethnicity, gender, age, offense type, offense severity, evidence of
possession, type of disposition, time in the system, and crime specialization
(for second or later offenses) are statistically removed. If firearms use is
found to be statistically significant, and if it adds at least one year to felony
sentences, then it can be concluded that the California firearm sentence
enhancer is used by the courts.
Table 1 shows the Ordinary Least Squares equation predicting prison
sentence length for all defendants for their first pass through the criminal
justice system. Controlling for the severity of the offense, firearms use, and
other relevant factors, the equation shows that the defendants convicted of
homicide, burglary, theft, auto theft, and other felonies receive significantly
longer sentences than defendants convicted of robbery (the reference
category).3 6 Similarly, the more serious the offense, the longer the prison
sentence. Cases resolved by guilty pleas and by juries also receive
significantly shorter sentences than bench trials. The finding that a guilty plea
results in shorter sentences is consistent with most prior research; the
efficiency of guilty pleas is generally found to be rewarded with lenient
sentences. Less attention has been paid to jury versus bench trials. It is likely
that jurors are less jaded than judges, however, and that they accordingly
recommend shorter sentences. This finding is not specific to Ordinary Least
Squares analysis, since Marjorie Zatz and John Hagan found a similar effect
using a different analytic technique.3 7 Characteristics of the defendant (such
as race/ethnicity, age, or gender), evidence of possession, and time in the
system do not significantly affect sentence length for first arrests.
36. Again, these relations exist independently of other factors which have been statistically
controlled. In part, this finding means that, after removing the impact of the severity of the offense
on sentence length, homicide, burglary, theft, and auto theft receive significantly longer sentences
than robbery.
37. Zatz & Hagan, COime, Time and Punishment: In Exploration of Selection Bins in Sentecing" Reseach.
I J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 103 (1985).
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REGRESSION OF
TABLE 1
SENTENCE LENGTH ON EXOGENOUS FACTORS,
FIRST ARRESTS
Race/Ethnicity
Chicano
Black
White a
Female
Age
Young (18-20)
Old (41+)
Middle-aged,
Offense Type
Homicide
Assault
Burglary
Theft
Auto Theft
Forgery
Rape
Narcotics
Other Felony
Robberya
Firearm Used
Possession
Offense Severity
Mode of Disposition
Plea
Jury
Judge"
Process Time in Days
(Constant)
Prison Sentence Length
N = 313
*Sig at P < .05.
**Sig at P < .01.
***Sig at P < .001.
"Reference category.
-10.34
1.27
-26.42
25.30
-25.96
61.45**
16.72
52.48***
64.25**
64.62*
27.37
4.69
- 5.58
39.47*
- 9.99
24.82
25.69***
- 151.88***
- 107.21***
0.03
62.58
F = 11.84***
se. of b
10.45
9.60
18.95
17.47
15.33
18.88
16.27
14.85
20.29
29.77
30.26
21.51
19.48
16.95
16.64
21.67
3.33
25.00
26.92
0.04
33.27
-0.05
0.01
-0.07
0.06
-0.08
0.18
0.05
0.24
0.18
0.11
0.06
0.01
-0.02
0.12
-0.03
0.09
0.57
-0.60
-0.39
0.25
0.35
0.05
0.06
0.08
0.08
0.09
0.23
0.07
0.02
0.04
0.05
0.11
0.09
0.07
0.11
4.05
0.85
0.12
0.03 151.82 96.11
55.78
R 2 = .45
adj R2 = .41
Despite the mandated sentence enhancer, use of a firearm does not signifi-
cantly affect the length of sentence to prison. In fact, the effect is in the oppo-
site direction from that which would be expected if the enhancer were
applied: Use of a firearm has a slight (and nonsignificant) negative impact on
sentence length when the type of offense, its severity, and other factors are
made equivalent for all cases. These results suggest that the type and severity
of the offense, as well as the method of case disposition, have the greatest
effects on sentencing.
Rs.d.
0.44
0.48
0.23
0.23
0.27
0.27
0.28
0.42
0.26
0.15
0.20
0.21
0.31
0.28
0.26
0.32
2.04
0.36
0.33
91.01
210 [Vol. 49: No. I
SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT IN CALIFORNIA
Table 2 refines the analysis reported in Table 1 by excluding crimes not
likely to involve a gun. Because these nongun offenses may generate "noise"
(i.e., variation due to uncontrolled factors) that could mask the firearms effect,
the equation is respecified with only homicide, rape, burglary, assault, and
robbery convictions included. Once again, homicide and burglary increase
the sentence length compared with robbery, serious offenses receive longer
sentences than less serious offenses, and cases that are resolved by a guilty
plea receive lighter sentences than those decided byjudges. In addition, con-
trolling for other factors, use of firearms again has a nonsignificant negative
effect on prison sentence length.
TABLE 2
REGRESSION OF SENTENCE LENGTH ON EXOGENOUS FACTORS, FIRST
ARRESTS, FOR HOMICIDE, RAPE, BURGLARY, ASSAULT, AND
ROBBERY CONVICTIONS
b se. of b [3 ' s.d.
Race/Ethnicity
Chicano -20.07 14.20 -0.09 0.22 0.42
Black 1.88 12.31 0.01 0.37 0.48
White a
Female -57.45 46.15 -0.07 0.01 0.12
Age
Young (18-20) 9.95 20.05 0.03 0.08 0.27
Old (41+) -20.10 24.90 -0.05 0.05 0.22
Middle-ageda
Offense Type
Homicide 57.06* 23.30 0.19 0.12 0.33
Rape 1.49 24.82 0.00 0.07 0.26
Burglary 54.32** 18.73 0.27 0.35 0.48
Assault 17.20 17.91 0.06 0.13 0.34
Robberya
Firearm Used -14.21 19.70 -0.04 0.09 0.28
Possession - - - 0 0
Offense Severity 26.80*** 5.24 0.56 4.39 2.01
Mode of Disposition
Plea - 132.73* 44.86 -0.48 0.86 0.35
Jury - 72.88 46.55 -0.25 0.12 0.33
Judgea
Process Time in Days 0.03 0.05 0.03 153.58 101.64
(Constant) 41.16 53.46
Prison Sentence Length 61.26 95.77
N = 209 F =9.93*** R 2 = .42
adj R2 = .38
*Sig at P < .05.
**Sig at P < .01.
***Sig at P < .001.
aReference category.
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Because sentence length varies by the type of offense (which is reasonable
under determinate sentencing guidelines), it is possible that the type of
offense might mask and interact with the effect of using a firearm. Accord-
ingly, analyses are conducted separately for first arrests that were robbery,
assault, and homicide convictions. Rapes and burglaries are excluded since
none of the first arrests resulting in convictions for these offenses involved
firearms. It is possible that for these cases a firearm was indeed used but that
this part of the charge was dropped during plea bargaining or in exchange for
a waiver of the speedy trial stipulations. The results for robbery convictions
are reported in Table 3. A small positive effect for firearms use is now visible.
Since this effect is not significant, however, we must again conclude that use
of a firearm has no impact on prison sentence lengths.
TABLE 3
REGRESSION OF SENTENCE LENGTH ON EXOGENOUS FACTORS, FIRST
ARRESTS, FOR ROBBERY CONVICTIONS
b se. of b [3 X s.d.
Race/Ethnicity
Chicano - 0.99 6.41 -0.02 0.23 0.43
Black - 3.27 5.40 -0.09 0.42 0.50
Whitea
Female - - - 0 0
Age
Young (18-20) 6.74 7.67 0.11 0.10 0.30
Old (41+) - - - 0 0
Middle-ageda
Firearm Used 4.97 5.89 0.10 0.19 0.39
Possession - - - 0 0
Offense Severity -19.84 12.49 -0.22 4.96 0.21
Mode of Disposition
Plea 30.71* 15.29 0.62 0.83 0.38
Jury 34.85* 16.18 0.65 0.15 0.36
Judgea
Process Time in Days 0.03 0.03 0.13 138.54 73.04
(Constant) 115.08* 57.09
Prison Sentence Length 51.71 18.95
N = 69 F =1.05 R 2 = .12
adj R2 = .01
*Sig at P < .05.
,Reference category.
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Similarly, results reported in Table 4 and Table 5 demonstrate that
defendants who assault or kill with firearms are given sentences that are statis-
tically identical to those for persons who commit these crimes without guns.
The mandatory sentence enhancer is simply not used for first convictions of
any type. Instead, the severity of the offense has the greatest influence on
sentence length, even within crime categories.
TABLE 4
REGRESSION OF SENTENCE LENGTH ON EXOGENOUS FACTORS, FIRST
ARRESTS, FOR ASSAULT CONVICTIONS
b se. of b 13 X s.d.
Race/Ethnicity
Chicano 5.99 8.46 0.17 0.26 0.45
Black 4.74 6.68 0.16 0.52 0.51
Whitea
Female -9.15 14.91 -0.11 0.04 0.19
Age
Young (18-20) 3.66 10.24 0.06 0.07 0.27
Old (41+) -4.50 9.71 -0.09 0.11 0.32
Middle-ageda
Firearm Used 14.11 9.54 0.24 0.07 0.27
Possession 0 0
Offense Severity 6.59** 1.93 0.56 4.33 1.30
Mode of Disposition
Pleab 0.89 0.32
Jury 22.08* 8.35 0.46 0.11 0.32
Judge-
Process Time in Days 0.03 0.03 0.16 149.96 90.21
(Constant) 3.73 11.88
Prison Sentence Length 43.26 15.41
N = 27 F = 2.99* R 2 = .61
adj R2 = .41
*Sig at P < .05.
**Sig at P < .01.
aReference category.
1
'"Plea" was removed from the equation because there were too few cases to be meaningful.
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TABLE 5
REGRESSION OF SENTENCE LENGTH ON EXOGENOUS FACTORS, FIRST
ARRESTS, FOR HOMICIDE CONVICTIONS
b se. of b X s.d.
Race/Ethnicity
Chicano -34.29 125.95 -0.06 0.20 0.41
Black 135.61 112.87 0.23 0.16 0.37
Whitea,
Female 2.18 145.66 0.00 0.08 0.28
Age
Young (18-20) - - - 0 0
Old (41+) 27.33 128.37 0.05 0.16 0.37
Middle-aged-
Firearm Used -124.21 157.91 -0.19 0.12 0.33
Possession - - - 0 0
Offense Severity 41.49* 23.31 0.38 7.16 2.04
Mode of Disposition
Plea -420.11** 196.55 -0.91 0.68 0.48
Jury -255.22 192.12 -0.53 0.28 0.46
Judgea
Process Time in Days 0.12 0.34 0.07 231.64 125.75
(Constant) 200.70 269.44
Prison Sentence Length 172.00 220.33
N = 25 F =2.60* R2 = .61
adj R 2 = .38
*Sig at P < .10.
**Sig at P < .05.
aReference category.
What might account for these findings? First, the number of cases
resulting in prison sentences for each of these offense types is small. This
limitation is important because statistically significant results are obtained
more easily with large numbers of cases.
Second, sentence length is greatly influenced by the type and severity of
the offense and by the method of case disposition, and these rival factors are
held constant here. Therefore, we are looking at a weak (that is, conservative)
test of our hypothesis. For these cases, the use of firearms was not dropped as
a condition for waiving the speedy trial stipulation, nor was the case bargained
down to exclude the firearms aspect of the offense.
Third, a number of studies have found that crimes committed with knives
tend to involve more injury than those committed with guns.31 Judges may be
more responsive to the amount of injury than to the use of a gun per se.
38. See J. CONK[IN, ROBBERY AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 117 (1972); F. FEENEY & A.
WEIR, "IHE PREVENTION ANI) CONTROl. OF ROBBERY: A SUMMARY 77 (1974); Cook, Reducing Injury and
Death Rates in Robbery
, 
6 PoCN' ANAIAsIs 21. 33 (1980); Zimring, supra note 7, at 732-33, 734
(measuring the seriousness or violencc of an attack by the location of the wound).
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Finally, it may be that first offenders, even those using a gun, are "given a
break" by the courts. If repeat offenders are considered particularly dan-
gerous or incorrigible, then the firearms enhancer might be used only for
those persons displaying more of a career orientation to crime. The latter
hypothesis is tested in the next analyses.
Equations predicting prison sentence length are estimated for defendants
who made two, three, four, and five or more passes through the California
courts for felony offenses in the three years under consideration. In addition
to the variables included in the earlier equations, the degree of crime speciali-
zation across all earlier arrests is controlled for in these analyses.
Table 6 and Table 7 demonstrate that for second and third arrests, use of a
firearm still has no effect on the length of prison sentence. While the prior
offenses may or may not have involved firearms, for second arrests the offense
specialization variable is positive and significant. The coefficient for speciali-
zation means that defendants convicted of the same type of offense for their
first and second arrests receive sentences twenty-five months longer than sim-
ilar defendants whose first and second convictions differ in type. Also, con-
trolling for all other factors, second arrests resulting in convictions for assault
receive longer sentences than convictions for robbery. Furthermore, the
longer the time required to process the case through the system, the longer
the sentence. Again, this suggests that defendants are penalized for taxing
court resources. For third arrests, the severity of the offense is the only vari-
able in the equation to increase sentence length.
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TABLE 6
REGRESSION OF SENTENCE LENGTH ON EXOGENOUS FACTORS,
SECOND ARRESTS
b se. of b 3 X s.d.
Race/Ethnicity
Chicano 9.04 11.70 0.07 0.22 0.41
Black - 6.71 10.63 -0.06 0.30 0.46
White,,
Female 6.04 22.49 0.02 0.04 0.20
Age
Young (18-20) 41.46* 21.24 0.16 0.05 0.21
Old (41+) 6.48 22.98 0.02 0.04 0.20
Middle-aged-
Offense Type
Homicide -11.20 23.19 -0.04 0.05 0.21
Assault 40.80** 18.42 0.20 0.08 0.27
Burglary -15.45 15.39 -0.12 0.21 0.41
Theft - 4.49 20.48 -0.02 0.08 0.27
Auto Theft 7.82 33.36 0.02 0.02 0.14
Forgery 7.77 29.44 0.04 0.09 0.28
Rape 4.31 24.14 0.02 0.05 0.21
Narcotics -11.43 26.46 -0.06 0.11 0.31
Other Felony - 7.95 17.09 -0.05 0.12 0.33
Robberya
Firearm Used 7.15 19.67 0.04 0.08 0.27
Possession -13.48 23.12 -0.10 0.20 0.40
Offense Severity 4.42 3.17 0.16 3.79 1.94
Offense Specialization 25.19** 10.97 0.20 0.24 0.43
Mode of Disposition
Plea - 0.98 21.44 -0.01 0.83 0.38
Jury 31.87 23.94 0.20 0.13 0.34
Judge-
Process Time in Days 0.09* 0.05 0.15 149.81 96.27
(Constant) 5.00 30.72
Prison Sentence Length 42.32 54.67
N = 149 F = 2.02*** R 2 = .25
adj R2 = .13
*Sig at P < .10.
**Sig at P < .05.
• **Sig at P < .01.
!,Reference category.
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TABLE 7
SENTENCE LENGTH ON EXOGENOUS FACTORS,
THIRD ARRESTS
se. of b
Race/Ethnicity
Chicano
Black
Whitea
Female
Age
Young (18-20)
Old (41+)
Middle-aged-
Offense Type
Homicide
Assault
Burglary
Theft
Auto Theft
Forgery
Rape
Narcotics
Other Felony
Robbery"
Firearm Used
Possession
Offense Severity
Offense Specialization
Mode of Disposition
Plea
Jury
Judgea'
Process Time in Days
(Constant)
Prison Sentence Length
N = 124
-15.68
-16.92
-31.75
2.47
-27.15
5.00
-18.39
-30.67
-26.43
-52.65
-39.98
-38.04
-26.66
15.61
3.74
11.04*
30.71
20.36
27.88
- 0.00
13.58
19.72 -0.08
12.97 -0.13
26.80
38.49
26.17
41.63
35.21
22.15
27.46
43.72
40.39
34.85
29.75
22.20
30.04
29.76
5.36
22.66
27.54
30.65
0.06
41.48
F = 1.29
0.01
-0.08
0.01
-0.07
0.01
-0.13
-0.15
-0.06
-0.19
-0.12
-0.18
-0.13
0.05
0.02
0.31
0.14
0.13
0.16
-0.01
0.06
0.02
0.07
0.02
0.03
0.28
0.11
0.02
0.06
0.04
0.11
0.11
0.05
0.12
3.60
0.17
0.79
0.15
153.59
49.12
R
2 
= .21
adj R 2 = .05
0.32
0.49
0.23
0.15
0.25
0.15
0.18
0.45
0.32
0.15
0.23
0.20
0.31
0.32
0.22
0.33
114.16
64.38
*Sig at P < .05.
"Reference category.
For fourth and later arrests, the use of firearms in committing an offense
significantly increases the sentence length. Table 8 shows that for fourth
arrests, firearms use increases the sentence length by fourteen months. This
effect is significant, though not at the level generally desired for social science
research. Rather, it is signficant at the. 10 level, meaning that ten times out of
100 this same effect will result from chance factors alone.
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TABLE 8
REGRESSION OF SENTENCE LENGTH ON EXOGENOUS FACTORS,
FOURTH ARRESTS
b se. of b 13 X s.d.
Race/Ethnicity
Chicano 4.95 6.02 0.09 0.18 0.39
Black - 5.74 4.68 -0.13 0.39 0.49
Whitea
Female - 5.50 14.22 -0.04 0.02 0.14
Age
Young (18-20) 1.35 13.69 0.01 0.02 0.14
Old (41+) - 5.94 9.15 -0.06 0.05 0.22
Middle-ageda
Offense Type
Homicide - 5.28 20.37 -0.03 0.01 0.10
Assault -11.17 8.34 -0.16 0.10 0.29
Burglary - 8.45 8.01 -0.18 0.26 0.44
Theft -10.29 9.87 -0.14 0.08 0.28
Auto Theft 0.11 9.83 0.00 0.11 0.31
Forgery -11.45 13.95 -0.12 0.05 0.22
Rape -16.68 19.38 -0.08 0.01 0.10
Narcotics - 8.40 15.09 -0.11 0.08 0.28
Other Felony -10.27 9.92 -0.16 0.13 0.33
Robberya
Firearm Used 14.02* 7.54 0.23 0.14 0.35
Possession 0.13 10.72 0.00 0.20 0.40
Offense Severity 5.27** 1.63 0.44 3.04 1.77
Offense Specialization 8.05 9.06 0.09 0.16 0.23
Mode of Disposition
Plea - 7.57 13.90 -0.12 0.86 0.35
Jury 1.25 14.54 0.02 0.12 0.32
Judgea
Process Time in Days 0.02 0.02 0.11 132.72 95.48
(Constant) 28.37 17.55
Prison Sentence Length 35.79 21.08
N = 95 F =2.69*** R 2 = .44
adj R2 = .27
*Sig at P < .10.
**Sig at P < .01.
***Sig at P < .001.
aReference category.
For fifth or later arrests, Table 9 shows that firearms use increases the
sentence length by twenty-nine months, and this effect is significant at the
desired .05 level. Thus, the mandated sentence enhancer for firearms
offenses is used, but only when the defendant has been arrested at least four
times in the three-year period analyzed here. It should be noted that the ear-
lier arrests may or may not have involved firearms.
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TABLE 9
REGRESSION OF SENTENCE LENGTH ON EXOGENOUS FACTORS,
FIFrH OR LATER ARRESTS
b se. of b 1 X s.d.
Race/Ethnicity
Chicano 6.92 7.47 0.12 0.15 0.36
Black 2.92 5.43 0.07 0.53 0.50
White a
Female
Age
Young (18-20) 3.89 10.08 0.04 0.05 0.21
Old (41+) 6.23 12.24 0.07 0.06 0.24
Middle-ageda
Offense Type
Homicide - - - 0 0
Assault 10.67 14.04 0.09 0.03 0.17
Burglary 7.62 10.38 0.17 0.27 0.45
Theft 5.37 11.27 0.10 0.15 0.36
Auto Theft 5.15 13.94 0.06 0.06 0.24
Forgery 8.83 13.73 0.12 0.08 0.27
Rape 35.64* 14.70 0.30 0.03 0.17
Narcotics 4.85 11.07 0.08 0.12 0.33
Other Felony - 2.53 9.84 -0.05 0.17 0.38
Robberya
Firearm Used 29.01* 13.31 0.30 0.05 0.21
Possession - 6.79 9.38 -0.12 0.17 0.38
Offense Severity 6.46* 2.53 0.49 3.15 1.55
Offense Specialization - 6.49 11.01 -0.06 0.15 0.20
Mode of Disposition
Plea -12.38 11.52 -0.24 0.82 0.39
Jury - 6.38 12.93 -0.11 0.14 0.35
Judgea
Process Time in Days - 0.04 0.03 -0.16 114.33 84.00
(Constant) 15.73 16.87
Prison Sentence Length 28.39 20.41
N = 66 F = 3.18** R2 = .57
adj R2 = .39
*Sig at P < .05.
**Sig at P < .001.
aReference category.
In addition to and controlling for the firearms effect, the severity of the
crime also significantly increases the prison sentence for fourth and later
arrests. For fifth or later arrests, persons convicted of rape receive longer
sentences than similar defendants convicted of robbery. 39
39. In California using a firearm during a rape carries a three-year mandatory sentence in
addition to the rape sentence. CAL.. PENAL CODE § 12022.5 (West Supp. 1984). Apparently, for fifth
and later offenses, rapists who use a gun are assigned longer sentences, but for fourth or earlier
offenses, the enhancement law is not applied.
Page 199: Winter 1986]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Interestingly, the coefficients for crime severity in Table 8 and Table 9 are
smaller than those for firearms. This result means that for earlier arrests it is
the severity of the offense (along with the type of offense) that has the greatest
influence on sentence length. For fourth arrests, the coefficient for firearms
attains the minimally acceptable level of significance, indicating an increase of
fourteen months to the base sentence for those defendants using firearms. In
contrast, each one-unit increase in the nine-point severity scale results in an
additional five months of prison. For fifth or later arrests, use of a firearm in
committing the offense increases the sentence length by two and one-half
years (twenty-nine months), while each increase in the severity scale increases
the sentence by only six months.
Another way of looking at these significant effects is to compare the stan-
dardized coefficients. These coefficients, called beta weights, indicate which
variables account for the greatest proportion of the variance in sentence
length within a given sample. Since the severity and firearms variables are
measured differently (i.e., severity is an integer scale and firearms is dummy-
coded), the effects in standard deviational units provided by the beta weights
are informative. For fourth arrests, the betas reported in Table 8 show that
severity accounts for a larger proportion of the variation in sentence length
than does firearms use (beta weights are .44 and .23, respectively). For fifth
or later arrests, Table 9 shows that severity again accounts for a larger pro-
portion of the variance than firearms (betas of .49 and .30, respectively).
Thus, offense severity consistently explains the greatest amount of variation
in sentence length, even though for fourth or later arrests each additional
point on the severity scale adds less time to the sentence than does the differ-
ence between using a gun and not using a gun.
V
CONCLUSION
Like the Michigan gun law, the California sentence enhancer is not used by
the courts. Moreover, speculation that a longer observation period might
show the law to be effective 40 is not borne out by data covering a three-year
period. Only the most serious repeat offenders are given additional sentences
for committing crimes with guns. The law is probably used as a mechanism
for "throwing the book" at these defendants.
The reason why the enhancement laws are not used is unclear. Perhaps
judges resent mandatory sentencing as an infringement on their discretion,
especially if they view rapes and homicides committed with knives and blunt
instruments as messier and more heinous than such crimes committed with
firearms. Another possibility is that defendants who used firearms may plead
guilty especially quickly, 4 1 and a quick plea reduces severity of the sentence.
Additionally, the firearm charge may be used as a bargaining chip in a plea
40. See Loftin & McDowall, supra note 4, at 163.
41. See Zatz & Lizotte, The Timing of Court Processing: Towards lmking Theory and .1ethod. 23
CRIMINOLOGY 313, 325 (1985).
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bargain agreement. It is also possible that judges do not realize the crime-
reducing potential of such laws. Alternatively, judges may reason that given a
hopelessly overcrowded prison system, mandatory prison sentences are
impossible to administer. If this were true, it would imply that judges do not
understand the life-saving and crime-reducing benefits of incarcerating gun
criminals as opposed to nongun criminals.
Another explanation is suggested by Joan Petersilia's findings across three
states that whites show a clear preference for the use of guns in crime,
Hispanics for knives, and blacks also for guns (but not to the same extent as
whites). 42 Although the current study did not find any major effects of
race/ethnicity, perhaps judges are less likely to lock up whites using guns than
blacks or Hispanics using knives for the same offenses. Of course, if this is
true it implies discrimination in sentencing.
Mandatory sentence enhancers for the use of firearms during felonies may
reduce deaths in the commission of crime, and they may reduce the overall
crime rate due to special or general deterrence. They certainly reduce the
death and crime rates through incapacitation. They could assist in the
elimination of gender, class, race, or ethnic discrimination in sentencing.
These laws could also make citizens feel more secure by fostering a sense of
trust in the ability of the criminal justice system effectively to mete out
reasonable punishments. Beyond this speculation, however, it is impossible
for social scientists to give public policy advice on the efficacy of these laws so
long as the laws are not enforced. If the laws were enforced, their effect on
the crime rate or on the death rate due to crime could be evaluated. Changes
in discrimination in sentencing could also be evaluated. Finally, the effect on
public attitudes toward the criminal justice system could be measured. All of
this research could lead to sound public policy advice-but it cannot be
offered until the mandatory sentence enhancer laws are enforced.
42. J. PETERSILIA, supra note 32, at viii, xxi, 78-79.
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